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The health and stability of a modern democracy
depends, not only on the justice of its “basic structure”
but also on the qualities and attitudes of its citizens.
(Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 352)
1. Introduction
Large-scale, cross-national indices of democratic quality
have traditionally paid little systematic attention to citi-
zens as a constitutive component of democratic quality.
In earlier work (Mayne & Geissel, 2016), we challenged
this orthodoxy by highlighting the importance of citizens
as central to the conceptualization of democratic qual-
ity. Specifically, we argued that democratic quality con-
sists of two necessary, but independently insufficient,
components. First, an “institutional component”, which
dominates research on democratic quality, refers to the
institutional and structural opportunities that allow for
democratic rule. Second, a “citizen component” relates
to the ways in which citizens can and do breathe life into
existing institutional opportunities for democratic rule.1
We identified three broad categories of citizen disposi-
tions as constitutive of the citizen component: namely,
democratic commitments, political capacity, and politi-
cal participation.
Providing a structured account of how citizens lie at
the core of the concept of democratic quality is impor-
tant for both scholarly and practical reasons. By includ-
1 This should not be confused with quality-of-democracy research that takes citizens into account using data on mass public assessments of political ac-
tors and institutions (see, e.g., Logan & Mattes, 2012; Pickel, Breustedt, & Smolka, 2016). These kinds of public opinion data are unrelated to what we
refer to here as the citizen component of democratic quality; instead, they provide (non-expert evaluative) information on the institutional component
of democratic quality.
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ing measures of electoral turnout, many existing studies
in this area partially or implicitly acknowledge that high-
quality institutions are not enough; a high-quality democ-
racy also requires citizens to use these institutions. Par-
ticipation in elections is, however, only one part of the
citizen component of democratic quality. To advance the-
oretical and empirical research in this area, it is necessary
to develop a systematic understanding of the place of cit-
izens within the concept of democratic quality. That is
the goal of this article. To this end, we expand the empir-
ical underpinnings of the study of democratic quality by
bringing it into conversation with research from political
behavior and political psychology. We also deepen the
engagement of quality-of-democracy research with po-
litical theory and political philosophy. Existing work on
democratic quality is often anchored in partial readings
of normative accounts of democracy, focused on extract-
ing what these accounts have to say about institutions.
As we show here, these same accounts have a great deal
to say about the kinds of citizen dispositions that are con-
stitutive of a high-quality democracy.
Taking citizens more seriously in how we understand
democratic quality also brings research in line with the
realities of national and international programs aimed at
supporting and deepening democracy. Publicly-funded
andphilanthropicwork has long had both an institutional
and a citizen component, seeking to improve the quality
of institutions as well as impact the values, competences,
and participatory proclivities of citizens. Traditionally this
work has been targeted at new, low- and middle-income
democracies, but—amidst growing fears of democratic
deconsolidation (Foa & Mounk, 2017; Levitsky & Ziblatt,
2018)—there has been an upsurge in interest in demo-
cratic programming in advanced industrial societies. By
fully incorporating citizens into the conceptualization of
democratic quality, we hope to bridge the existing gap
between practice and research, enabling work on quality
of democracy to speak to efforts of leaders and organiza-
tions working in the space of democracy promotion.
In the pages that follow, we aim to provide a solid an-
alytic foundation and conceptual framework to incorpo-
rate data on the citizen component of democratic quality
in future empirical research. We do this by building on
our earlier work in three ways. In the next section, we
provide a more fine-grained and structured conceptual-
ization of democratic commitments, political capacities,
and political participation. In the second section of the ar-
ticle, we address the question of congruence or “fit” be-
tween the institutional and citizen components of demo-
cratic quality. Third, we develop the idea that the degree
of consistency of democratic commitments, political ca-
pacities, and political participation with the same model
of democracy is an important aspect of democratic qual-
ity. We illustrate the issues of inter-component congru-
ence and inter-dispositional consistency using available
cross-national empirical data. The article ends with a dis-
cussion of the significant limitations of existing interna-
tional survey programs as sources of data for measuring
the citizen component of democratic quality.
2. Citizen Dispositions
Just as the Varieties of Democracy project (Coppedge et
al., 2011) has shown that different models of democracy
value different kinds of institutional arrangements, it is
important to recognize that there is no one-size-fits-all
understanding of the core dispositions that comprise the
citizen component of democratic quality. We therefore
focus our attention on how three models of democracy,
which have long dominated academic and policy debates,
understand each disposition. This includes: minimal-
elitism—epitomized by the work of Joseph Schumpeter
(1950) and E. E. Schattschneider (1975); liberal-pluralism,
defined and developed perhaps most famously in the
work of Robert Dahl (1971, 1989); and participatory
democracy, championed by scholars such as Carole Pate-
man (1970) and Benjamin Barber (1984).2
2.1. Democratic Commitments
That democratic commitments are a necessary compo-
nent of democratic quality finds support in a long line of
writing. As John Stuart Mill (1861/2009, p. 7) noted, “the
people for whom the [democratic] form of government
is intendedmust bewilling to accept it”. Democratic com-
mitments refer to the political beliefs, values, principles,
and norms that citizens hold dear. They combine both
cognitive and affective orientations, which citizens use
to understand and judge the political world. A sizeable
body of empirical research has emerged in recent years
on how citizens understand democracy (Bratton, Mattes,
& Gyimah-Boadi, 2005, Chapter 3; Canache, 2012; Car-
rión, 2008; Dalton, Sin, & Jou, 2007; Fuchs & Roller, 2006;
Kornberg & Clarke, 1994; Miller, Hesli, & Reisinger, 1997;
Silveira & Heinrich, 2017; Thomassen, 1995), but the lit-
erature on the more specific question of which demo-
cratic values and principles citizens actually endorse is
still fairly limited (Carlin, 2017; Carlin & Singer, 2011; Hi-
bbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Kriesi, Saris, & Moncagatta,
2016; Lalljee, Evans, Sarawgi, & Voltmer, 2013;McClosky,
1964; Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007).
The concept of democratic commitment operates at
two levels: at a general level in the formof citizens’ broad
preference for democracy over non-democratic forms
2 In this article we are argue that citizens are constitutive of the concept of democratic quality; we are silent on the question of whether the concept
of democracy itself includes a citizen component. We note, however, that the answer to this question has been a resounding no. Scholarship has
predominantly distinguished democracies from non-democracies (or hybrid regimes) in one of two ways: based exclusively on electoral procedures
(e.g., Przeworksi, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000); or using a more expansive set of procedural criteria, that take account of not just the quality of
electoral processes but also the protection of civil liberties and civilian control of the military, among other things (e.g., Mainwaring, Brinks, & Pérez-
Liñán, 2007). The first approach distinguishes democracies based on institutions that lie at the heart of the minimal-elitist conception of democracy;
the second approach is anchored more in the liberal-pluralist account of democracy. In both cases, selection criteria are essentially institutional.
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of political organization; and at a more specific level in
termsof citizens’ support for particular principles and val-
ues. The idea that democracies require citizens’ general
democratic commitment finds clear support in work on
democratic consolidation aswell as democratic deconsol-
idation.3 Building on this research, we understand demo-
cratic quality as being in part a function of how commit-
ted citizens are to democracy, even in the face of mobi-
lization by anti-democratic forces, economic misfortune,
and electoral losses.
The study of democratic quality requires going be-
yond this general commitment to democracy and tak-
ing into account citizens’ commitments to more specific
democratic values. Pragmatically, this makes it easier to
identify whether citizens’ general democratic commit-
ment is in fact nominal and without meaningful con-
tent; it is also necessary because different models of
democracy set store by different types of political values.
A theory-driven approach requires being clear on how
the model(s) of democracy underpinning one’s assess-
ment interpret core democratic principles in different
ways, or even accommodate different democratic prin-
ciples. To gain analytic purchase on the issue of demo-
cratic commitments, we propose that scholars focus on
the principled responses that different models of democ-
racy provide to the following two questions. First, who
gets to decide? Second, how are decisions to be made?4
The question of who gets to decide is first and fore-
most about what citizens consider to be the proper
role of elected politicians in democratic decision mak-
ing. A helpful way of thinking about this issue is in terms
of the checks and balances that different models of
democracy expect citizens to support, which concerns
the power of elected politicians relative to other “politi-
cal” actors, e.g., the judiciary or subnational authorities.
It also concerns checking and balancing among different
classes of politician,most notably between the executive
and legislature. Finally, the question of who gets to de-
cide is crucially linked to what citizens see as their own
role, acting individually or collectively, in democratic de-
cision making.
The second question of howdecisions are to bemade
relates to citizens’ settled opinions on how core demo-
cratic principles should be instantiated in democratic pro-
cesses and structures. This fundamentally concerns not
just the formal rules but also the institutionalized norms
of encounter and exchange between elected politicians
and other political actors. Differentmodels of democracy
demand, explicitly and implicitly, different commitments
from citizens when it comes to how democratic decision-
making processes should take place. As a result, judge-
ments of any one country’s democratic quality will vary
greatly depending on the model used to carry out the
assessment. This becomes clear by looking at the demo-
cratic commitments expected of citizens by the three key
models of democracy (a summary of which is available
in Table 1).
The minimal-elitist account of democracy envisages
citizens to be committed to forms of decision making
dominated by parties, elected politicians, and the gov-
ernment of the day, with few checks and balances. Citi-
zens are expected to willingly accept their own voluntary
“retirement” (to borrow the words of Schumpeter, 1950,
p. 295) from political life between elections. As to the
question of how decisions are to be made, high-quality
minimal-elitist democracy is predicated on the expecta-
tion that citizens will be tolerant of political differences
and supportive of robust competition between those dif-
ferences at the ballot box. However, once votes are cast,
minimal-elitism expects citizens to support winner-take-
all majoritarianism, which necessarily implies electoral
losers (even perennial electoral losers) accepting their
political marginality.
High-quality liberal-pluralist democracies are also
home to citizenries that support elected politicians as
the primary decision-makers. However, “good” liberal-
pluralist citizens are additionally expected to be com-
mitted to the idea that politicians are checked and bal-
anced in important ways, for example by constitutional
protections and judicial oversight, or by divisions of
power between the executive and legislature, i.e., deci-
sion making that involves elected and unelected elites.
Citizens are expected to embrace their own role in demo-
cratic decision making as largely mediated: by the par-
ties/politicians they elect, and by the interest organiza-
tions who speak on their behalf. Liberal-pluralists expect
citizens to accept or even welcome that public policy will
be influenced by processes of consultation and lobbying,
involving politically independent intermediary organiza-
tions and associations. By extension, the “good” liberal-
pluralist citizen is expected to see negotiation and com-
promise among elites of different political persuasions as
a natural and proper part of the democratic process.5
The participatory model of democracy is distinct
from minimal-elitism and liberal-pluralism in that it ex-
pects citizens to support unmediated forms of mass pop-
ular involvement in democratic decision making. This
might include support for direct democratic mechanisms
that allow citizens to vote on specific issues as well as
participatory innovations (such as participatory budget-
ing and citizen juries) that give citizens decision-making
powers. While the participatory model of democracy
clearly sets great store by the idea that final decision-
making powers should lie with citizens themselves in at
3 As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note, “a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion, even in the midst of major eco-
nomic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way
to govern collective life” (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 16; see also Diamond, 1999, p. 69; Foa & Mounk, 2017).
4 These two questions effectively amount to two sides of the same coin of democratic decision making, and as such are likely difficult to sepa-
rate empirically.
5 Significant variations exist within the liberal-pluralist understanding of democracy, which encompasses classic forms of pluralistic decision making as
well as consensus or negotiation democracy (Lijphart, 1999).
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Table 1. The citizen component.
Core Dispositions Key Elements The “good” citizen according to:
Minimal-elitist Liberal-pluralist Participatory
model model model
1. Democratic Commitment regarding: Committed to Committed to Committed to
1. commitments • Who gets to decide? decision making electoral unmediated forms of
• How decisions should dominated by democracy where mass popular
• be made? parties and politicians are involvement in
elected checked and democratic decision
politicians, with balanced and making and idea that
few checks and intermediary politicians should
balances. organizations play actively consult
important role. citizens between
elections.
2. Political Capacity to: Capable of Capable of Possessing skills and
2. capacities • know selecting into enlightened knowledge that
• choose their values, understanding of enable them to
• influence preferences, and their own interests cooperate,
interests based on and sufficiently communicate, and
menu of options tuned into politics to deliberate with
provided to them be able to identify and fellow citizens and
by political elites support, if need be, political elites.
in lead up to organizations that
elections. can defend their
values and interests.
3. Political Participation that is: Pay sufficient No duty to Directly and actively
3. participation • Electoral vs. non-electoral attention to participate actively involved in politics
• Mediated vs. direct politics during in politics, but on an ongoing basis,
• Other-regarding election campaign ideally occasionally with emphasis on
to avoid being undertakes mainly other-regarding and
duped and turn mediated forms of public-oriented
out to vote, if participation. political activities.
interests at stake.
least certain issue or policy areas, it also demands that
where elected politicians retain decision-making powers
they should undertake continuous processes of consul-
tation with citizens between elections. This is one of the
chief differences between participatory democracy and
minimal-elitism and liberal-pluralism when it comes to
the question of “how” decisions should be made.
2.2. Political Capacity
Existing cross-national indices of democratic quality
rarely include indicators capturing levels of political ca-
pacity among citizenries.6 This contrasts with statements
on the importance of political capacity made by demo-
cratic theorists of various stripes as well as the growing
fears expressed by political commentators of citizens’ in-
capacity to resist misinformation. The absence of direct
measures of political capacity from existing quality-of-
democracy indices also runs counter to the large body of
empirical research on political capacitywithin the field of
political behavior. Key questions that have animated this
research include: are citizens able to maintain internally-
consistent and ideologically-structured beliefs? How po-
litically knowledgeable and civically literate are citizens?
Do citizens interrogate their own beliefs by finding and
accurately processing new or unbiased sources of polit-
ical information? How capable are citizens of voting for
politicians and parties that will best represent their val-
ues and interests?7 Debates among empirical political sci-
entists regarding how much and what kinds of political
6 An exception is the Democracy Ranking (Campbell, 2008), which includes measures of secondary-school and university enrolment aimed at capturing
the availability of “knowledge” in a society. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy Index includes data on levels of adult literacy and the
share of the population that follows politics in the news.
7 See, for example, Achen & Bartels, 2016; Alvarez & Nagler, 2000; Andersen, Tilley, & Heath, 2005; Arnold, 2012; Barabas & Jerit, 2009; Bartels, 1996;
Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Lau, Patel, Fahmy, & Kaufman, 2014; Lavine, Johnston, &
Steenbergen, 2012; Lodge & Taber, 2013; Lupia, 2016; Milner, 2002; Mutz, 2006; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Page & Shapiro, 1992; Rapeli, 2014;
Rosema & de Vries, 2011; Zaller, 1992.
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capacity are required of citizens for democracy to flour-
ish is reflective of important conceptual disagreements
about what makes a democracy high quality. All major
models of democracy clearly identify political capacity as
important for democracy; they differ significantly how-
ever in their understanding of what types and levels of
political capacity matter for high-quality democracy.
How exactly then do different models of democracy
understand the concept of political capacity? To answer
this question, we propose focusing on three types of po-
litical capacity. The first is the capacity of citizens to un-
derstand or know their own values, preferences, and in-
terests that they wish to see realized through the demo-
cratic process. The second is the capacity of citizens to
identify and select elites who will defend and advance
those values, preferences, and interests in the political
arena. The third and final capacity is the capacity to in-
fluence political elites and the agendas they pursue. For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to these three core demo-
cratic capacities as the capacity to know, the capacity to
choose, and capacity to influence. For a summary of how
these three capacities are understood by three key mod-
els of democracy, see Table 1.
Let us first turn to the capacity to know. For advocates
of minimal-elitist democracy, little is expected of citizens.
Schumpeter famously argued that citizens are “incapable
of action other than a stampede” (1950, p. 283); such low
levels of political capacity associated with stampede-like
cognition and affect are seen as in no way undermining
a country’s quality of democracy. For minimal-elitists, cit-
izens need only be capable of selecting into their values,
preferences, and interests based on the menu of options
provided to them by political elites during the short win-
dowof public debate that periodically occurs prior to elec-
tions. That said, as Schumpeter points out, for minimal-
elitist democracy to work well, citizens must be on “an in-
tellectual andmoral level high enough to be proof against
the offerings of the crook and the crank” (1950, p. 294,
emphasis added). This suggests that the “good” citizen
for minimal-elitists is able to process the content of pre-
election public debate in ways that allow her to identify
and resist the siren call of false information.
Liberal-pluralist and participatory models of democ-
racy are more demanding of citizens in terms of their
“capacity to know” their own values and interests. Both
models share an expectation that citizens should have
the capacity to arrive at what Tocqueville described as
“self-interest rightly understood” orwhat Dahl refers to as
“enlightened understanding”. In Democracy and Its Crit-
ics (1989, pp. 111–112), Dahl writes that “to know what
it wants, and what is best, the people must be enlight-
ened”. To achieve such enlightenment, Dahl argues that
citizens must acquire “an understanding of means and
ends, of one’s interests and the expected consequences
of policies for interests, not only for oneself but for all
other relevant persons as well”.8 The implication of this
is that citizens are expected to be capable of finding and
processing information and weighing the consequences
of their values and interests on those of fellow citizens.
When it comes to citizens’ capacity to choose po-
litical elites who will defend and pursue their interests,
minimal-elitist, liberal-pluralist, and participatory mod-
els of democracy have much in common. None of them
requires citizens to be extraordinary information sleuths
or indeed policy wonks; rather, they expect citizens to be
capable of taking full advantage of elite-provided sources
of structured information in order to choose leaders
without, as Schattschneider (1975, p. 134) puts it, be-
ing duped by demagogues. Themodels diverge, however,
along two dimensions: first, in terms of the range of elite
actors that citizens are expected to select; and second,
in terms of the period of time over which citizens are ex-
pected to select elites.
For minimal-elitists, the “good” citizen need only be
able to tune into politics in short bursts at election time.
Using information shortcuts generated by the process
of political competition during the campaign period, citi-
zens are expected to have the political wherewithal to se-
lect candidates and parties who will best serve their val-
ues and interests. For liberal-pluralists (seeGalston, 1988,
p. 1283) and participatory democrats, citizens are also ex-
pected to be able to make sense of available information
to select the right candidates and parties at election time.
In addition, they must be sufficiently tuned into politics
on an ongoing basis to be able to identify and support or-
ganizations and associations that will defend their values
and interests, as and when the need arises, by applying
pressure on elected politicians between elections.
Finally, what do the three models have to say about
citizens’ capacity to influence?Minimal-elitists expect cit-
izens to influence politics and policy making indirectly
through their vote choices and certainly not between
elections. Liberal-pluralist and participatory democrats
expect citizens to influence elites through forms of
Hirschmanian exit and voice. To influence elites via voice
requires citizens to possess cognitive, expressive, and or-
ganizational capacities. This includes the ability to iden-
tify whom to target and the capacity to work with others
to influence them. For participatory democrats, who ar-
gue that high-quality democracies provide wide-ranging
opportunities for citizens to get involved in shaping pub-
lic policy, it is particularly important that citizens pos-
sess skills and knowledge that enable them to cooperate,
communicate, and deliberate with fellow citizens and po-
litical elites alike (see Barber, 1984, p. 154).
2.3. Political Participation
One of the few citizen-related indicators that routinely
appears in existing cross-national quality-of-democracy
8 For in-depth discussions of the capacities expected of the “good” liberal citizen, see Galston (1988, especially pp. 1283–1285) and Macedo (1990, es-
pecially pp. 265–273). For the capacities required of the “good” participatory citizen, see the discussion of “strong democratic talk” in Barber (1984,
pp. 178–198).
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indices is turnout in national elections (see Altman &
Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Bühlmann et al., 2013; EIU, 2012;
Levine & Molina, 2011).9 This clearly points to a schol-
arly consensus that political participation is a core con-
ceptual component of democratic quality. High-quality
democracy cannot simply be understood in terms of the
existence of particular kinds of democratic institutions,
the most incontrovertible of which are free and fair elec-
tions; it is also defined by whether citizens actually turn
out to vote in those elections. Allmajormodels of democ-
racy set great store by electoral participation. They do
differ significantly though in the importance they attach
to other forms of political participation.
Over the years normative disagreements among po-
litical theorists and political philosophers have inspired
and echo similar debates among scholars of political be-
havior. In fact, the question of what types of political
participation are found in high-quality democracies goes
back to one of the founding studies in the field of polit-
ical behavior, The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and
Sidney Verba (1963), who argued that democracies are
best served by citizens who “balance” political activity
and passivity. In the half-century since the publication
of The Civic Culture, patterns of popular political partic-
ipation have changed greatly. However, the question of
how active citizens should be, and what forms political
activity should take remains central to the study of polit-
ical behavior.10
To capture how different models of democracy con-
ceive of political participation, we propose that schol-
ars of democratic quality pay particular attention to how
much weight is attached to: (1) participation focused
on elections versus acts of political participation that
occur between elections; (2) mediated forms of politi-
cal participation where citizens seek to influence poli-
tics through organized civil society versus direct forms
of political action and participation; and (3) the extent
to which political participation is “other-regarding” and
public-oriented. See Table 1 for a summary of the discus-
sion below.
For minimal-elitists, elections are the singular focus
of citizen participation. The primary political act of the
“good” citizen is therefore to turn out in periodic elec-
tions. To avoid political demagoguery, it can be assumed
that minimal-elitists expect citizens to pay attention to
politics during election campaign periods, consume polit-
ical news, and engage in political discussions.11 Between
elections, however, citizens are expected to engage in
few, if any, political acts, leaving politics to politicians
and parties.
For liberal-pluralists, citizens are under no duty to
participate actively in politics (Galston, 1988, p. 1284).
That said, there is an expectation that they will turn out
to vote, in line with their self-interest rightly understood.
This implies that the “good” liberal-pluralist citizen will
engage in forms of other-regarding political activities
that allow her to achieve an “enlightened” understand-
ing of her values and interests. The emphasis is placed on
forms of mediated political participation, most notably
engagement with organizations and associations, and by
extension social movements. There is also an expecta-
tion that in a high-quality liberal-pluralist democracy, cit-
izens will—to quote Stephen Macedo (1990, p. 274)—
“take initiatives on their own [and] be prepared to com-
bine in voluntary associations for common ends both al-
truistic and otherwise”.
For participatory democrats, citizens are expected to
be engaged in the electoral process in similar ways to
the “good” liberal-pluralist citizen. However, the partic-
ipatory model of democracy places a duty on citizens
to be directly and actively involved in politics on an on-
going politics. As Barber (1984, p. 152) writes, “[partic-
ipatory] democracy is the politics of amateurs, where
every man is compelled to encounter every other man
without the intermediary of expertise”. Finally, as these
words suggest, participatory democrats also expect cit-
izens to undertake political activities that are expressly
other-regarding and public-oriented, aimed at moving
beyond “competitive interest mongering” (1984, p. 155).
3. Inter-Component Congruence
Democracies don’t just need good institutions, they also
need citizens who are willing and able to breathe life into
those institutions. A version of this claim stands at the
heart of classic studies of democratic consolidation (Dia-
mond, 1999; Linz & Stepan, 1996) as well as more recent
debates about democratic deconsolidation (see Alexan-
der &Welzel, 2017; Foa &Mounk, 2017; Inglehart, 2016;
Norris, 2017; Voeten, 2017). The basic contention of this
body ofwork is that democracy canbe considered consol-
idated and stable when, among other things, democratic
institutions are firmly established and citizens are mean-
ingfully and unwaveringly supportive of democracy.
In contrast to research on democratic consolidation,
research on democratic quality has made little effort
to conceptualize the relationship between institutions
and citizens. The widespread inclusion of (national) elec-
toral turnout data in existing cross-national quality-of-
democracy indices points to an underlying academic con-
9 Existing quality-of-democracy indices also routinely include other participation-related indicators. The Democracy Barometer, for example, includes
data on reported rates of petitioning and demonstrations; Levine and Molina (2011) include data on the share of citizens who report having worked
for a candidate or party; the EIU incorporates information on membership of political parties and political non-governmental organizations as well as
participation in demonstrations.
10 See, for example, Dalton (2008); Fung (2004); Mutz (2006); Norris (2002); Rosenstone and Hansen (1993); Stolle andMicheletti (2013); Verba, Nie and
Kim (1978); Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995).
11 Some scholars of political participation do not consider political discussion or political news consumption a form of political participation because—to
quote Verba et al. (1995, p. 40) “the target audience is not a public official”. Here we adopt a more expansive understanding of political participation
that allows us to accommodate the full range of political actions identified explicitly or implied by different models of democracy.
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sensus that citizens are indeed conceptually constitutive
of democratic quality. However, this same research has
fallen short of giving any systematic conceptual consid-
eration to how citizens matter for democratic quality be-
yond participation in elections. By extension, they have
also failed to recognize the crucial issue that citizensmat-
ter in different ways depending on the model driving the
assessment. The conceptual short shrift that researchers
have given to citizens stands inmarked contrast to the de-
tailed and sophisticated discussions about how and why
different kinds of institutions and structures matter for
democratic quality. The goal of the previous section of
this article was to address this important gap in the lit-
erature by providing a conceptual account of the citizen
component of democratic quality. In this section we take
a step back to address themore general conceptual ques-
tion of the relationship between the citizen and institu-
tional components of democracy.
We conceive of the relationship between institutions
and citizens as it pertains to democratic quality in terms
of congruence.12 As such, we follow Mayne and Geissel
(2016, p. 636) in viewing the relationship between the
citizen and institutional components of democratic qual-
ity as one of mutual dependence or mutual condition-
ality. Our basic contention therefore is that institutions
and citizens represent two sides of the same democracy
coin,meaning that democratic quality is a function of the
level of model-specific congruence between institutions
and citizen dispositions. The more institutions and citi-
zen dispositions are simultaneously congruent with the
demands and expectations of the samemodel of democ-
racy, the higher that country’s quality of democracy be-
comes, at least when judged from the viewpoint of the
model in question.
Given that both the institutional and citizen compo-
nents are necessary conditions of democratic quality, it
is important to be clear about a key implication of our ar-
gument. If a country’s political institutions accord largely
with the expectations of a particular model of democ-
racy, but citizen dispositions do not (or vice versa), we
simply cannot say that this country has a high-quality
democracy. How exactly inter-component incongruence
would ultimately be calculated to arrive at a country’s
overall democracy score is a question for future empirical
research. The point we wish to make is that the value of
one component must, in a non-negligible way, be contin-
gent on the value of the other component. When consid-
ering this issue of mutual contingency, it is important to
distinguish between two types of inter-component con-
gruence: one static; the other dynamic.
3.1. Static Congruence
When one thinks about democratic quality in terms of
inter-component congruence, most likely one intuitively
thinks about congruence at a single point in time, i.e.,
static congruence. To illustrate this form of congruence,
we turn now to a brief examination of the level of fit
between citizen support for direct democracy, on the
one hand, and the institutionalization of direct democ-
racy, on the other. With this worked example, to be clear,
we are assessing democratic quality from the perspec-
tive of the participatory model of democracy. Given the
limitations of existing cross-national data sources, we
must content ourselves here with this partial illustration,
which offers but a small and incomplete analytic win-
dow into understanding levels of model-specific inter-
component congruence.
Table 2 presents information, from a broad cross-
section of countries, on the share of citizens who view
referendums as an essential component of democracy,
alongside a (national-level) measure of the actual institu-
tionalization of direct-democratic mechanisms.13 Taken
together, these indicators provide at best minimally sug-
gestive evidence for evaluating democratic quality from
the perspective of the participatory model of democ-
racy; still they are very helpful in illustrating inter-
component congruence.
Surveying the data in Table 2, it is clear that citizen
commitments and real-world institutions match in some
countries but are totally “out of sync” in others. A ma-
jority of citizens in Switzerland and Uruguay support the
idea that democracies should give people a direct say
in political decision making; both countries also offer a
range of direct-democraticmechanisms. Similarly, we ob-
serve higher levels of inter-component congruence (but
in the opposite direction) in Finland, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom, where less than 20 percent
of citizens report strong participatory democratic com-
mitments and where direct democratic mechanisms are
weakly institutionalized. In contrast, we find evidence
of inter-component incongruence in many other coun-
tries. Popular majorities in Cyprus, Argentina, and Ger-
many, for example, prefer a participatory form of democ-
racy, but direct democracy is weakly institutionalized in
those countries. From the point of view of static inter-
component congruence and using this imperfect illustra-
tion of participatory democracy as the yard stick of eval-
uation, we would conclude that democracy is of a higher
quality in Switzerland and Uruguay than in Argentina
and Cyprus.
12 See Almond and Verba (1963); Eckstein (1998); Welzel and Inglehart (2006); Welzel and Klingemann (2011).
13 Data on the presence of direct democracy come from the Democracy Barometer (2012). Public opinion data come from the fifth wave of the World
Value Survey (fielded between 2005 and 2009). Nationally representative samples of citizens were asked whether referendums are an essential part
of democracy and provided with a 1–10 response scale, with 1 indicating that referendums are not at all essential and 10 indicating that they are
definitely essential. We follow other research in using response data only for the scale maximum. As Kriesi et al. (2016, p. 67) note, survey respondents
“who choose a value below the scale maximum arguably allow for exceptions and do not consider the given element as required for democracy under
all circumstances”.
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Table 2. Support for and institutionalization of direct
democracy. Source: Geissel (2016).
Country Support for Institutionalization
direct of direct
democracy democracy
Argentina 53.8 1
Australia 46.7 1
Brazil 43.0 1
Bulgaria 39.8 2
Canada 19.5 1
Chile 37.9 0
Cyprus 55.1 0
Finland 14.3 0
France 24.6 1
Germany 51.8 0
Hungary 40.9 3
Japan 30.0 1
Mexico 19.1 0
Netherlands 17.3 0
Norway 31.7 0
Peru 29.8 3
Poland 42.9 1
Romania 43.0 1
Slovenia 39.6 3
South Africa 20.9 0
South Korea 34.3 1
Spain 45.8 0
Sweden 43.0 0
Switzerland 59.6 3
Turkey 45.3 1
United Kingdom 17.0 0
United States 25.5 0
Uruguay 50.4 3
3.2. Dynamic Congruence
Over time political institutions change, as do citizen dis-
positions; and in many ways these changes are pro-
foundly connected. Existing political institutions not only
bound many citizens’ democratic imagination, they also
play an important role in shaping how citizens participate
in politics as well as the political capacities they develop.
Likewise, by failing to meet citizens’ expectations, polit-
ical institutions can generate democratic re-imaginings,
stimulate and diffuse alternative forms of political partic-
ipation, and encourage citizens to develop new political
capacities. The opposite is also true. Elites reform politi-
cal institutions in part as a response to change over time
in citizens’ democratic commitments, transformations in
political activism, and improvements in mass political
capacities. Moreover, institutional reform and changes
in citizen dispositions seldom proceed in a neat, linear
fashion. This means that, when viewed over a long pe-
riod of time, both types of change might slowly be mov-
ing a country away from congruence with one model
of democracy, toward congruence with another model.
During periods of change, however, we will necessarily
observe inter-component incongruence.
From the static perspective of congruence, inter-
component incongruence lowers a country’s quality of
democracy, which may be misleading from a long-term
perspective. It is crucial to make allowances for the pro-
cesses of mutual adjustment of institutions and citizen
dispositions toward new equilibria. A key analytic ad-
vantage of conceiving of inter-component congruence
in both static and dynamic terms is that it allows us to
distinguish between two sets of democracies. On the
one hand, low-quality democracies where institutions
and citizens are effectively more or less permanently
out of sync with each other. And on the other hand,
countries where institutions and citizen dispositions are
slowly moving in the same democratic direction; and
where the processes ofmutual adjustment underpinning
these changes are in fact a powerful positive indicator of
the quality of democracy.
4. Inter-Dispositional Consistency
Just as different models of democracy ideally expect
the institutional and citizen components of democratic
quality to be congruent, they also expect—ideally—
democratic commitments, political capacities, and polit-
ical participation to be consistent with each other. Inter-
dispositional consistency (or intra-component congru-
ence) represents an important yardstick for evaluating
democratic quality, because, regardless of the model of
democracy driving the assessment, a high-quality democ-
racy depends on a particular mix and balance of com-
mitments, capacities, and participation. For example, a
high-quality participatory democracy is not just home to
large numbers of citizens participating actively in politics,
at and between elections, but also to large numbers of
people who have the capacities to cooperate, commu-
nicate, and deliberate. Similarly, minimal-elitists might
only expect citizens to participate in periodic elections,
but when they do, they are also expected to be able to
avoid being misled or fooled by political elites vying for
their votes.
Over the years, scholars of political behavior have
studied empirically how citizen dispositions relate to one
another. One approach has been to examine the influ-
ence of certain kinds of democratic commitments on
political participation. Recent work, by Åsa Bengtsson
and Henrik Christensen (2016) and Sergiu Gherghina and
Geissel (2017) finds clear associations between citizens’
democratic “process preferences” and how they partici-
pate in politics. For example, citizens who support a par-
ticipatory model of democracy are more likely to partic-
ipate in politics (see also Bolzendahl & Coffé, 2013; Dal-
ton, 2008). A large body of research also exists on the
question of how political capacities relate to political par-
ticipation. Consistently research has found a positive as-
sociation between education and political participation.
Compared to the legion of studies that examines the
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impact of education, income and political interest (as a
proxy of political capacity), very little research has been
done on how the cognitive, expressive, and organiza-
tional capacities specifically identified by different mod-
els of democracy relate to participation.14 This is mainly
due to the dearth of cross-national survey data, aimed
at capturing information on political capacity. All in all,
we still know very little about how the varied citizen dis-
positions prized by minimal-elitist, liberal-pluralist, and
participatory democracy “move” together.
We now turn to some worked examples. We rely
here on existing cross-national survey data, from the
World Values Survey, the International Social Survey Pro-
gram, the European Social Survey, and the Latin Amer-
ican Public Opinion Project. In particular, we focus on
whether democratic commitments, using data on citi-
zen support for referendums, align with political capac-
ity and political participation.15 Though extremely crude,
the question on referendums is helpful for the present
purpose of illustrating a key aspect of citizens’ demo-
cratic commitments—namely, the importance of politi-
cal participation beyond regular legislative elections. We
use citizens’ reported interest in politics as a very rough
(and imperfect) overarching proxy for citizen capacity,
and create an index of non-electoral political participa-
tion using available data sources.16
Figure 1 plots aggregate-level support for referen-
dums against the share of citizens who say they are in-
terested in politics. Examining the data from the per-
spective of the participatory model of democracy, it be-
comes clear that very few countries display a high level
of inter-dispositional consistency. Only three countries
(Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland) are home to citi-
zenries with the commitments and capacities expected
by participatory democrats; namely, sizeable majorities
(of more than 60 percent) who see referendums as a
good way to decide important political issues and who
are interested in politics. In many other countries, how-
ever, participatory commitments are misaligned with po-
litical capacities. Cyprus, Croatia, Spain, and Brazil are
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Figure 1. Interest in politics and support for direct democracy.
14 A small body of work, mainly focused on the United States, exist on the relationship between political knowledge and political participation, see Delli
Carpini and Keeter (1996); Milner (2002); Nie et al. (1996); Verba et al. (1995).
15 The question comes from two rounds of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, fielded in 2004 and 2014). Survey respondents were asked
if they agree that referendums are a good way to decide important political questions. We report here the results for citizens who strongly agree with
this statement. We aggregate (and average, where necessary) data using available population weights to produce measures of citizen dispositions that
are representative of citizenries as a whole.
16 We use a question (from ISSP 2004 and 2014) about citizens’ general interest in politics. Respondents who say they are very or somewhat interested
in politics are combined. It is important to note, however, that the minimal-elitist model of democracy expects citizens to be interested in politics
during elections, but not between them. The index of non-electoral political participation is based on three questions that appear in the ISSP (2004 and
2014), the World Values Survey, the European Social Survey, and Latin American Public Opinion Project. These relate to signing a petition, taking part in
a demonstration, and contacting a public official. The index captures the share of citizens who report having undertaken at least one of these activities
in the past 12 months.
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cases in point: large numbers of citizens favor a partic-
ipatory approach to political decision making, but far
fewer are interested in politics. From the perspective of
minimal-elitism, only Hungary comes close to displaying
ideal levels of inter-dispositional consistency. More than
60 percent of Hungarians have no strong desire for ref-
erendums and an even greater share of Hungarians say
they are not interested in politics. In a number of other
countries, such as Chile or the Czech Republic, we find cit-
izenries with the kinds of political capacity (reflected in
low levels of political interest) that minimal-elitists argue
make for a higher-quality democracy, but who also re-
port democratic commitments that are inconsistent with
a high-quality minimal-elitist democracy. Few countries
are home to citizenrieswith commitments and capacities
consistent with a liberal-pluralist account of democracy.
Belgium and Slovenia arguably come closest. In many
other democracies (such as France, Uruguay, and Ire-
land) we find citizenries with political capacities that are
consistent with liberal-pluralism, but whose democratic
commitments are not.
Figure 2 once again plots our indicator of democratic
commitments (namely, support for referendums), but
this time against a measure of non-electoral political par-
ticipation. For minimal-elitists, a high-quality democracy
is one where few citizens undertake political activities
between elections; the opposite is true for participatory
democrats. For liberal-pluralists, democracy works best
when citizens exert themselves politically between elec-
tions only when the need arises. As a result, moderate
levels of non-electoral political participation are arguably
most consistent with high-quality democracy from the
perspective of liberal-pluralists.
Hungary is the most obvious case of minimal-elitist
inter-dispositional consistency. As noted earlier, Hungar-
ians appear to be less fond of direct democracy and very
few engage in political activities between elections. Ice-
land, New Zealand, Canada, and Norway, among others,
are home to citizenries with democratic commitments
and patterns of political participation consistentwith par-
ticipatory democracy. Applying a liberal-pluralist bench-
mark, Belgium and the Netherlands appear to come clos-
est to displaying the desired types and levels of political
participation and democratic commitments. Most coun-
tries, however, are home to large numbers of people
withmixed patterns of citizen dispositions that are incon-
sistent with any one model of democracy.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have argued that democratic quality de-
pends not only on the form and functioning of demo-
cratic institutions but also on the dispositions of citi-
zens.17 To date, however, cross-national indices have fo-
cused predominantly on the institutional component of
democratic quality, the measures of which have become
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Figure 2. Non-electoral political participation and support for direct democracy.
17 Democratic quality also depends on the dispositions of political elites, most obviously their commitment to democracy as well as their level of political
competence (see, for example, Linz & Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2013; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen, 2004).
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increasingly multidimensional and conceptually sophisti-
cated. The Varieties of Democracy program (Coppedge
et al., 2011) has enriched this approach by making it pos-
sible to systematically evaluate democratic institutions
according to different models of democracy. The same
cannot be said of the citizen component of democratic
quality. Existing indices commonly incorporate informa-
tion on national turnout rates, which points to an aca-
demic consensus that citizens are indeed a constitutive
element of democratic quality. Few other citizen-related
indicators are, however, included, andwhen they are it is
oftenwith little theoretical justification. The result is that
citizens play conceptual second fiddle to institutions, and
there is little or no recognition that different accounts
of democracy demand and expect different kinds of citi-
zen dispositions. Our aim with this article is to challenge
this orthodoxy by providing a structured account of the
citizen component of democratic quality, with a focus
on three models of democracy—minimal-elitism, liberal-
pluralism, and participatory democracy.
The first section of the article provided a fine-grained
conceptualization of what we argue are the three core
dispositions that make up the citizen component of
democratic quality—namely, democratic commitment,
political capacity, and political participation. We made
the case that commitment is not just about general
support for democracy but also model-specific commit-
ments related to who gets to decide and how decisions
are to bemade in the political arena.We defined political
capacity in terms of citizens’ ability to know, choose, and
influence, identifying key differences in how the three
models conceive of political capacity. Finally, to capture
the kinds and levels of political participation that differ-
ent models of democracy expect of citizens, we argued
that scholars of democratic quality should focus on the
weight attached to: election-focused participation ver-
sus participation between elections; mediated versus di-
rect forms of political action; and “other-regarding” po-
litical participation that brings together citizens with di-
vergent political viewpoints.
The second and third sections of the article deal
with two key issues that arise when taking citizens se-
riously in the conceptualization of democratic quality.
The first is the issue of “fit” between institutions and
citizens, which we refer to as inter-component congru-
ence. Specifically, we made the case that any assess-
ment of democratic quality must consider the extent
to which both institutions and citizen dispositions are
congruent with the same model of democracy. We fur-
ther underscored the importance of distinguishing static
congruence—where democratic quality is judged accord-
ing to the level of inter-component congruence at single
point in time, and dynamic congruence—where demo-
cratic quality is judged according to long-term processes
of mutual adjustment between institutions and citizen
disposition toward the same model of democracy.
The other significant issue we addressed was inter-
dispositional consistency. Ideally, we argued, democratic
commitments, capacities, and participation should all
be consistent with the same model of democracy. To il-
lustrate this point we turned to an analysis of existing
cross-national survey data,which provided suggestive ev-
idence that citizen dispositions are highly inconsistent
with each other in many democracies. Cognizant of the
imperfections of the available data, this nonetheless has
important implicationswhen developing compositemea-
sures of the citizen component of democratic quality.
The greatest challenge moving forward with our
conceptualization of democratic quality relates to data
availability. In writing this article we undertook a sys-
tematic and broad survey of existing cross-national sur-
veys.18 Our aim was to identify questions that could
serve as indicators to operationalize the citizen compo-
nent of democratic quality. In some regards, existing
cross-national survey programs provide a solid founda-
tion to build on; in other respects, however, much work
remains to be done. In recent years, the measurement
of democratic commitments has improved greatly. Well-
established questions that gauge citizens’ general sup-
port for democracy have been supplemented with new
batteries of questions shedding light on citizens’ commit-
ment to specific democratic principles, capturing infor-
mation on a variety of democratic principles shared by
all key models of democracy. There has, however, been
some effort to include one or two questions that allow re-
searchers to distinguish commitments to principles spe-
cific to minimal-elitist, liberal-pluralist, and participatory
accounts of democracy. One goal of this article has been
to provide a fuller account of the commitments expected
of citizens by different models of democracy.
We also found that the measurement of political
participation is fairly strong, with information being fre-
quently collected on a broad range of non-electoral
forms of participation. It is difficult though to isolate
“other-regarding” forms of political participation, which
are important for liberal-pluralist and participatory ac-
counts of democracy. Given the challenges of political
polarization and social division that face many demo-
cratic societies today, future quality-of-democracy re-
search would therefore benefit from being able to mea-
sure how much citizens are actually engaging in politi-
cal activities that involve encountering and working with
others with different political viewpoints.
Finally, and most worrying of all, we found that
the measurement of political capacities is weak. Cross-
national surveys often ask citizens to self-report on their
general sense of political understanding or competence.
Some surveys also gauge citizens’ level of political knowl-
edge, but developing cross-nationally commensurable
measures of political knowledge has been challenging
(Gidengil, Meneguello, Shenga, & Zechmeister, 2016).
Overall though, unlike some surveys carried out in in-
18 This included the World Values Survey, ISSP, European Social Survey, Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, European Election Study, and Latin
American Public Opinion Project.
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dividual countries, to date no cross-national measures
have been fielded aimed at directly capturing informa-
tion on citizens’ cognitive, expressive, and organizational
capacities. This is not to underestimate the difficulty of
developing valid and reliable empirical indicators of polit-
ical capacity, but the lack of data in this area poses a real
problem for quality-of-democracy research. As we have
argued in this article, citizens’ capacity to know, choose,
and influence in the political arena is central to the qual-
ity of democracy. By detailing how different models of
democracy understand these three capacities in differ-
ent ways, we hope that this article provides a valuable
resource for developing new survey questions to fully in-
corporate the citizen component into future quality-of-
democracy research.
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